We examine the association between the provision of non-audit services and earnings quality. Because of concerns regarding the effect of non-audit services on financial reporting credibility, the Securities and Exchange Commission recently issued revised auditor independence rules requiring firms to disclose in their annual proxy statement the amount of fees paid to auditors for audit and non-audit services. Using data collected from proxy statements filed between February 5, 2001 and June 15, 2001, we present evidence that firms purchasing more non-audit services from their auditor are more likely to just meet or beat analysts' forecasts and to report larger absolute discretionary accruals. However, the purchase of non-audit services is not associated with meeting other earnings benchmarks. We also find that the unexpected component of the non-audit to total fee ratio is negatively associated with stock returns on the filing date. These results are consistent with arguments that the provision of non-audit services strengthens an auditor's economic bond with the client and that investors price this effect.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper provides empirical evidence on the relation between non-audit services and earnings quality. We test hypotheses concerning: (1) the association between a firm's purchase of non-audit services from its auditor and earnings management, and (2) the stock price reaction to the disclosure of non-audit fees. In the past decade there has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of fee revenue auditors derive from non-audit services, yet we know little about how non-audit services are related to earnings quality. 1 Concern about the effect of non-audit services on the financial reporting process was a primary motivation for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue revised auditor independence rules on November 15, 2000. The rules require firms to disclose the amount of all audit and non-audit fees paid to its auditor.
The provision of non-audit services to audit clients may increase the quality of financial reporting by providing the auditor with information about the client's business that is useful in performing the audit (Antle et al. 1997; Pitt and Birenbaum 1997) . Non-audit services may also increase the auditor's investment in reputational capital (Arruñada 1999) . A competing view is that the provision of non-audit services strengthens the auditor's economic bond with the client, thereby increasing the auditor's incentive to acquiesce to client pressure (Simunic 1984; Parkash and Venable 1993; Firth 1997 ).
The first set of tests focuses on one dimension of earnings quality of particular concern to the SEC in recent years (Levitt 1998) , i.e., management's deliberate intervention in the earnings process in the form of earnings management. We examine the propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks and the level of a firm's absolute discretionary accruals to assess whether percentile rank of total fees is not associated with either meeting analysts forecasts or absolute discretionary accruals. Taken together, this evidence suggests that the components of fees paid to the auditor have different implications for audit quality. The audit fee evidence is consistent with the argument that audit fees increase an auditor's investment in reputational capital.
Results from the event study indicate a negative association between share prices and the announcement of higher than expected non-audit fees. However, the statistical significance of the evidence is sensitive to the assumed expectations model for non-audit fees. We find a marginally significant negative association between share prices and FEERATIO and RANKNON. However, we find statistically significant evidence of a negative association between share prices and a proxy that explicitly controls for the expected component of FEERATIO. These results provide some consistent with the argument that investors perceive the provision of non-audit services to strengthen an auditor's economic bond with the client.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the SEC's new rules on auditor independence and develops our hypotheses. Section III describes the research design. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V summarizes and concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT SEC rule on auditor independence
In November 2000, the SEC issued Final Rule S7-13-00, Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements. The Rule defines independence as "a mental state of objectivity and lack of bias" and adopts a two-pronged test to determine if an auditor is independent. The first prong is direct evidence of the auditor's mental state, commonly referred to as independence "in fact." However, mental states are not directly observable, and thus the second prong provides for an assessment of independence "in appearance" based on observation of external facts. The Rule specifies that the SEC will not consider an auditor to be independent with respect to a particular client "if a reasonable investor, with knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude that the auditor is not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment" (SEC 2000, Section I).
The Rule provides four guiding principles for making independence determinations.
These principles state that independence is impaired when an auditor: (1) has a mutual or conflicting interest with the audit client; (2) audits the auditor's own work; (3) functions as management or an employee of the audit client; or (4) acts as an advocate for the audit client.
The Rule also identifies situations in which the auditor is not independent of the client because of certain financial or employment relationships, although these restrictions are more limited than under prior rules. In addition, the Rule identifies and prohibits certain non-audit services that it believes impairs independence regardless of the size of fees they generate.
Finally, the Rule requires companies to disclose in proxy statements filed on or after February 5, 2001 , information regarding fees billed by the auditor for the most recent year.
These fee disclosures are intended to provide information useful to investors in evaluating whether the magnitude of fees for non-audit services has impaired the auditor's independence.
Firms are required to disclose:
(1) under the caption "Audit Fees" the aggregate fees billed for the audit of the annual financial statements and for reviews of the quarterly financial statements;
(2) under the caption "Financial Information Systems Design and Implementation Fees" the aggregate fees billed for professional services rendered for (i) directly or indirectly operating or supervising the company's information system or local area network, or (ii) designing or implementing hardware or software that aggregates financial statement source data or data significant to the financial statements; and (3) under the caption "All Other Fees" the aggregate fees billed for all services rendered by the auditor other than those described in (1) and (2).
Firms are also required to disclose if the audit committee (or the board of directors if there is no audit committee) considered whether the provision of non-audit services is compatible with maintaining the auditor's independence.
Hypothesis development
The provision of non-audit services and earnings management
Auditors facilitate contracting between investors and management by attesting to the reliability of the financial statements. However, the auditor's monitoring is valuable to investors only if the auditor is independent (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) . DeAngelo (1981) defines independence within a broader framework of audit quality. Audit quality is the joint probability that the auditor discovers and reports a misstatement, and independence is considered compromised when auditors fail to report misstatements they have discovered.
The provision of non-audit services can impair independence by creating an economic bond between auditor and client. Simunic (1984) models the joint demand for audit and nonaudit services. He defines a decrease in auditor independence as "any situation which alters incentives such that a self-interested auditor is more likely to ignore, conceal, or misrepresent his findings." 2 He shows that when the same auditor provides both services and the auditor retains a portion of the cost savings from "knowledge spillovers," the auditor will be economically bonded to the client. 3 Parkash and Venable (1993) and Firth (1997) present empirical evidence using U.S. and U.K. data, respectively, that firms act as if the purchase of non-audit services 2 Other definitions of independence are also discussed in the literature. Magee and Tseng (1990, 322) state that a lack of independence implies that "an auditor's decisions are not consistent with his or her beliefs about a reporting policy." Antle (1982 Antle ( , 1984 and Baiman et al. (1991) developed a conceptual framework for analyzing auditor independence as collusion between the auditor and the manager. 3 Subsequent empirical work, however, fails to find evidence consistent with the existence of "knowledge spillovers" (Palmrose 1986; Abdel-khalik 1990; Davis et al. 1993 ).
jeopardizes independence. Both studies find that firms requiring high quality audits because of high agency costs will be less likely to purchases non-audit services from their auditor. Gore et al. (2001) present evidence also using U.K. data of a positive association between the provision of non-audit services and earnings management. They also document that non-Big Five auditors allow more earnings management than Big Five auditors.
The agency literature views auditor bias to be a deliberate form of misrepresentation. In contrast, an evolving body of experimental literature suggests that psychological heuristics unintentionally and unconsciously lead auditors to bias judgments. Beeler and Hunton (2001) present experimental evidence that audit partners are more likely to initially assume that the client is a going concern and to revise downward their initial estimate of the number of hours budgeted to the audit when there are contingent economic rents arising from the provision of non-audit services. The authors attribute these findings to an information processing bias known as predecisional distortion of information. Bazerman et al. (1997) argue that the self-serving bias poses a similar threat to independence and concludes that "the problem lies not in our desire to be unfair, but in our inability to interpret information in an unbiased manner."
Policy makers offer similar arguments. For example, the Public Oversight Board (POB) of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (POB 2000, 119) states that:
Of fundamental importance in understanding the conflict of interest that arises from the provision of non-audit services to audit clients is the fact that in so doing the audit firm is really serving two different sets of clients: management in the case of management consulting services, and the audit committee, the shareholders and all those who rely on the audited financials and the firm's opinion in deciding whether to invest, in the case of the audit… It is obvious that in serving these different clients the firm is subject to conflicts of interest that tear at the fragile fabric of loyalty owed to one client or the other. And it is equally obvious that the existence of dual loyalties creates a serious appearance problem, regardless of whether, in particular cases, the fabric actually tears apart or not.
The above arguments imply that the provision of non-audit services results in lower audit quality and an increased likelihood the auditor will waive earnings management attempts. An auditor concerned about the possible loss of non-audit fee revenue may be less likely to disagree with management's accounting choices, giving firms greater leeway to manage earnings.
A competing viewpoint suggests that the provision of non-audit services strengthens audit quality and can thus reduce earnings management. Academic research and policy arguments also provide support for this view. For example, a 1997 White Paper submitted to the Independence Standards Board by Pitt and Birenbaum (1997, 4) states that:
…the overwhelming economic interest of accounting firms in their reputational capital provides a powerful incentive to safeguard independence. Non-audit services increase the firm's investment in reputational capital, contribute importantly to the quality of audit services and provide other benefits to clients and the public. Arruñada (1999) formally models the argument that non-audit services increase audit quality by providing information about the client firm's business that complements the audit function and increasing an audit firm's investment in reputational capital. Using similar arguments to DeAngelo (1981) , he shows that reputational penalties constrain the behavior of audit firms because the gains from acquiescing to any one client's demands are outweighed by the reputational losses that would be imposed by other clients who value the audit firm for its reputation for independence. Relatedly, Dopuch et al. (2001) analytically demonstrate that the increase in reputational capital resulting from the provision of non-audit services will increase auditor independence and audit quality provided that the probability of misstatement risk is low. 4 In addition to the reputational cost arguments, institutional factors support the contention that non-audit fees do not adversely effect auditor independence. First, auditors face significant legal sanctions from poor quality audits. Aggregate legal claims against the Big Six auditing firms exceeded $30 billion at the end of 1992. 5 Second, no evidence exists that the provision of non-audit services poses a threat to auditor independence (Antle et al. 1997; Wallman 1996) .
Third, investors do not appear to be concerned about the provision of non-audit services (Antle et al. 1997) . Finally, insurers perceive no additional legal liability arising from the provision of non-audit services (Antle et al. 1997 ).
Because of the competing views on the provision of non-audit services, we test the following hypothesis, stated in null form:
H1: The provision of non-audit services to audit clients is not associated with earnings management.
The provision of non-audit services and shareholder wealth
The provision of non-audit services may affect investors' perceptions of audit quality.
For example, the provision of non-audit services may reduce the probability of truthful audit reporting if the non-audit services generate economic rents. If investors require compensation for a perceived increase in the probability of nontruthful reporting, then a loss in firm value will occur (Simunic 1984) . 6 In addition, a perceived reduction in audit quality may trigger negative share price adjustments due to a downward revision in the perceived persistence of the firm's earnings stream (Teoh and Wong 1993 Barry and Brown (1985) . 7 Consistent with these arguments, Feroz et al. (1991) and Dechow et al. (1996) present evidence that companies receiving accounting enforcement actions by the SEC for manipulating earnings experience a decline in stock prices around the announcement of the enforcement action. The stock price response for our sample is not expected to be as extreme, however, because we do not focus on a sample of firms identified by the SEC as violating Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
result, investors may infer higher audit quality when firms disclose the purchase of non-audit services from their auditor, leading to an increase in firm value.
Given the two possible shareholder interpretations of the relation between non-audit services and perceived audit quality, we test the following hypothesis, stated in null form:
H2: There is no share price reaction to the disclosure of non-audit fees.
If investors infer reduced audit quality and thus penalize firms purchasing non-audit services from their auditors, one may question whether this is a viable equilibrium. One answer is that the equilibrium cannot be sustained, i.e., firms will not continue to purchase non-audit services from their auditor. However, even if such an equilibrium cannot be sustained, a stock price response to the disclosure of non-audit fees can still occur. Alternatively, such an equilibrium can be sustained (i.e., firms will continue to purchase non-audit services from their auditor despite the negative share price effects) if choosing another firm to provide the services would be costlier or produce fewer benefits. Non-audit services may be more costly and produce fewer benefits when purchased from a firm that has less specific knowledge of the company than the auditor. More generally, managers may continue to engage low quality auditors even if the market penalizes them for doing so because such a penalty is lower than the cost of engaging a high quality auditor (Simunic 1984; Becker et al. 1998) . Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the fee data. Panel A reports statistics for the three categories of fees required to be disclosed by the new auditor independence rule. The mean (median) ratio of audit fees to total fees is 0.51 (0.49), but ranges from a minimum of 0.02 to a maximum of 1.00. Only eight percent of sample firms engaged their auditor to provide financial information systems design services (IS). Although the mean (median) ratio of IS fees to total fees is 0.02 (0.00), untabulated findings indicate that this ratio is 0.28 (0.17) for firms that incurred these fees. The mean (median) ratio of other fees to total fees is 0.47 (0.48), with 96 8 The noncompliance rate for our sample is thus 6 percent (i.e., 218 ∏ 3,455), well below the noncompliance rate of 17 percent reported by Abbott et al. (2001) . However, their sample includes only proxy statements filed between February 5, 2001 and March 16, 2001 . We find that the noncompliance rate for our sample during this time period is 13 percent, while the noncompliance rate for proxy statements filed after March 16, 2001 is 5 percent. Abbott et al. (2001) report that firms failing to disclose auditor fees are significantly smaller and more likely to have a non-Big Five auditor. As shown below, small firms and firms with a non-Big Five auditor report lower fees for non-audit services.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN

Sample description
percent of the sample reporting fees in this category. Finally, the mean (median) ratio of nonaudit fees (i.e., the sum of IS and other fees) to total fees is 0.49 (0.51).
In addition to the mandatory disclosures of fee data, approximately one-third of the sample (1,052 firms) voluntarily disclose information on the composition of other fees. 9 To provide a parsimonious description of this data, we code these fees into four categories: (i) auditrelated, e.g., audits of employee benefit plans, regulatory audits, and preparation of registration statements and other SEC filings, (ii) tax, e.g., preparation and filing of tax forms, and tax-related consulting, (iii) combined audit-related and tax, consisting of fees from both of the previous two categories, and (iv) other advisory, e.g., general consulting services, and information technology consulting for systems not associated with the financial statements. 10
Panel B of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the components of other fees. Audit- The remaining columns of Table 3 report, by auditor, the median of the client-specific ratios of fees billed in each category to total fees. Once again, Big Five auditors differ substantially from non-Big Five auditors. The median ratio of non-audit fees to total fees is 0.30 for the non-Big Five auditors, while for Big Five auditors the ratio is at least 0.50. Thus, at least half of the Big Five's audit clients pay non-audit fees in excess of audit fees. However, note that the median ratio of non-audit fees to total fees is lower than the proportion of total fee revenue derived from non-audit fees. Thus, a relatively small number of clients account for a disproportionate amount of each of the Big Five auditor's non-audit fee revenue.
The data summarized in Tables 2 and 3 differs markedly from 1999 data considered by the SEC in formulating the rule on auditor independence (SEC 2000) . 11 The earlier data suggests that non-audit fees comprise ten percent of total revenues, with almost three-fourths of audit clients purchasing no non-audit services. In contrast, our findings indicate that non-audit fees 11 The SEC obtained their data from the "Special Supplement: Annual Survey of National Accounting Firms -2000," Public Accounting Report (March 31, 2000) and from reports filed with the AICPA's SEC Practice Section.
comprise approximately 70 percent of total fee revenue (Table 3) , with 96 percent of audit clients purchasing non-audit services (Table 2 , Panel A). Although the categorization of fees used to compile the 1999 data may not be strictly comparable to that required under the new SEC rule, this comparison illustrates that the actual magnitude and frequency of non-audit services is considerably greater than prior estimates.
Model specification
Measures of non-audit service fees
We use the auditor fee disclosures to develop two measures of non-audit services. The first measure is the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FEERATIO). The SEC's purpose in requiring the fee disclosures is to provide investors with information to evaluate "whether the proportion of fees for audit and non-audit services causes them to question the auditor's independence" (SEC 2000, Section III.c.5). Moreover, this ratio has been used as a proxy for auditor independence in prior research (Scheiner 1984; Glezen and Millar 1985; Beck, et al. 1988; Parkash and Venable 1993; Barkess and Simnett 1994; Firth 1997) . However, this measure is invariant to the scale of the fees, and thus does not capture the relative financial importance of the client to the auditor. In addition, it is not possible to determine the extent to which cross-sectional variation in the ratio is driven by the level of non-audit fees as opposed to audit fees.
DeAngelo (1981) argues that auditor independence is inversely related to the value of quasi-rents specific to a particular client, and suggests that the relative magnitude of fees dependent on each client is a potential surrogate for independence. Lacking fee data, prior studies have used the ratio of client sales to total sales audited by the auditor (e.g., Stice 1991; Lys and Watts 1994; Reynolds and Francis 2001) . Our second measure of non-audit services is the percentile rank, by auditor, of the amount of non-audit fees disclosed by each firm (RANKNON). Firms in the highest percentile receive a rank of 100 while firms in the lowest percentile receive a rank of 1. We use percentile ranks rather than scaling by total audit firm revenue to mitigate error in the measurement of the relative magnitude of client-specific quasirents (Johnston 1984) .
Although our study focuses on the provision of non-audit services, prior literature generally does not make a distinction between audit and non-audit fees (e.g., Hansen and Watts 1997) . Indeed, some studies suggest that audit fees can also create economic dependence between the auditor and client (DeAngelo 1981; Simunic 1984) . Alternatively, higher audit fees may increase the auditor's investment in reputational capital, thereby increasing the loss from an impairment of independence (Arruñada 1999) . Several prior studies document a positive correlation between audit and non-audit fees (e.g., Simunic 1984; Palmrose 1986; Craswell et al. 1995) . Thus, in addition to RANKNON, we include the percentile rank, by auditor, of the amount of audit fees disclosed by each firm (RANKAUD).
Our tests include two additional auditor variables discussed in the prior literature.
DeAngelo (1981) argues that even when quasi-rents vary across clients, auditor size serves as a surrogate for audit quality. The most common proxy for auditor size is an indicator variable for Big Five auditors. Prior research finds that Big Five auditors are less likely to allow earnings management than non-Big Five auditors (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991,1993; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999) . Prior research also suggests that independence is decreasing in the length of auditor tenure (e.g., Beck et al. 1988; Lys and Watts 1994) . Thus, in addition to the fee-based measures discussed above, our analysis includes a Big Five indicator variable (BIGFIVE) and a variable measuring the number of years the auditor has audited the financial statements of the company (AUDTEN).
Estimation equations
We use two complementary approaches to identify firms managing earnings. Prior research (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Burgstahler and Eames 1998; Degeorge et al. 1999) documents a significantly higher than expected frequency of firms with slightly positive earnings surprises, earnings changes, and earnings levels, consistent with firms managing earnings to meet simple benchmarks. Both the SEC and the POB expressed particular concern that the pressure for public companies to meet analysts' expectations and project a smooth earnings path creates pressure on auditors to permit their clients to meet those objectives (SEC 2000; POB 2000) .
Using data obtained from First Call, we calculate earnings surprises as the difference between actual earnings per share and the last available consensus (median) forecast prior to the announcement of annual earnings, and identify firms that just meet or beat analysts' expectations as those reporting a surprise of 0.00 or 0.01. Similarly, following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), we identify firms reporting small increases in earnings and small profits by scaling net income and the annual change in net income by beginning of the year market value of common equity. 12 Untabulated results confirm a significant discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings surprises and earnings changes. However, in contrast to prior research, we find no evidence of a discontinuity in the distribution of earnings levels, either for all non-financial firms on Compustat in 2000 or for the sample firms. Because zero earnings does not appear to be a relevant benchmark during the sample period, we focus the analysis on small earnings surprises (SURPRISE) and small increases in earnings (INCREASE). 13 Prior research identifies several factors that influence firms' incentives to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Matsumoto (1999) reports that firms with high litigation risk, growth prospects, and institutional ownership are more likely to be concerned about missing earnings benchmarks. We measure litigation risk (LITRISK) as an indicator variable equal to one if the company operates in a high risk industry identified by Francis et al. (1994) . Growth is the market-to-book ratio (M/B), and institutional ownership (%INST) is the percentage of shares held by institutions (reported by Spectrum). In addition, Brown (2001) finds that loss firms are less likely to report positive earnings surprises, and thus our regression model includes an indicator variable (LOSS) equal to one if the firm reported a loss in 2000.
We control for operating cash flow scaled by average total assets (CFO) because firms with higher cash flow may be more likely to beat earnings benchmarks and may also be better able to afford outside consulting services. Acquisition and financing activity and poor performance are additional determinants of non-audit fees identified by Firth (1997 (1) Our second approach to identifying firms managing earnings uses discretionary accruals estimated with a cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model (see DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Becker et al. 1998; Bartov et al. 2001 ) . Discretionary accruals (DACC) are equal to:
where all variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year, and TA is total accruals, defined as net income less cash from operations, ∆REV is the change in net revenues, ∆REC is the change in net receivables, and PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment. The estimates of α, β 1 , and β 2 are obtained from estimating the following model at the industry level, where industry membership is identified using two-digit SIC codes:
We use the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) to measure the combined effect of income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management decisions (Warfield et al. 1995; Becker et al. 1998; Reynolds and Francis 2001) , and estimate the following Prior research shows that discretionary accruals models fail to completely extract nondiscretionary accruals that are correlated with firm performance. 15 Thus, we control for four measures of firm performance, all of which are deflated by average total assets: cash from operations (CFO), the absolute value of cash from operations (ABSCFO), total accruals (ACC) and the absolute value of total accruals (ABSACC). We also control for leverage, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (LEVERAGE), because prior research finds leverage to be associated with discretionary accruals (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; DeAngelo et al. 1994; Becker et al. 1998) . The remaining control variables in equation (4) are as defined above. Table 3 . All three of the dependent variables in our regression models, SURPRISE, INCREASE, and ABSDACC, are significantly higher for firms purchasing more non-audit services.
Descriptive statistics
The remaining variables in Table 4 indicate that non-audit fees are significantly correlated with several economic characteristics of the sample firms. High FEERATIO firms have higher cash flows, but lower total accruals. In addition, firms in the high FEERATIO group have significantly higher litigation risk, growth, and institutional shareholdings, and are more likely to engage in financing and acquisition activities. Profitability is also higher for firms above the median FEERATIO, but stock performance is lower. Finally, high FEERATIO firms are significantly larger than other firms. The empirical tests that follow control for these factors.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Association between non-audit fees and earnings management
Benchmark tests
The first test of the earnings management hypothesis examines the association between firms that just meet or beat earnings benchmarks and the purchase of non-audit services. The findings, reported in Table 5 , are mixed. 16 The association between SURPRISE and the nonaudit fee measures FEERATIO and RANKNON is positive and significant at the 0.01 level.
These results suggest that firms purchasing more non-audit services are more likely to just meet analysts' expectations, consistent with the earnings management concerns expressed by the SEC (2000) and POB (2000) . The coefficient estimate on RANKAUD is negative and significant, indicating that low audit fees are also associated with earnings management activity. Neither of the other two auditor-related variables, BIGFIVE and AUDTEN, are significant. The results for the remaining controls indicate that firms reporting small positive earnings surprises have greater litigation risk and institutional ownership, are larger, and are more likely to report a profit.
The basic premise of the benchmark analysis is that firms manage earnings to avoid missing benchmarks. Earnings management is thus presumed to exist for firms that just beat the benchmark but not for firms that just miss the benchmark. Therefore, we estimate the model for firms that just miss analysts' expectations (forecast errors of -0.01 or -0.02). The untabulated results indicate that FEERATIO and RANKNON are negative and significant (p-values less than 0.01) in the "just miss" regressions; RANKAUD is insignificant. 17 These results provide 16 The results are presented after the deletion of statistical outliers. However, all inferences are qualitatively similar if outliers are retained. 17 We also estimate the model for firms that beat analysts' expectations (forecast errors of 0.02 or 0.03). In this specification, both FEERATIO and RANKNON are insignificant (p-values of 0.70 and 0.71, respectively). The coefficient on RANKAUD is negative, with a p-value of 0.12.
additional evidence consistent with a correlation between non-audit fees and earnings management to beat analysts' expectations.
Statistical inference in the regression containing RANKNON and RANKAUD could be affected by multicollinearity because there is a high degree of correlation (+0.72) between these two independent variables. 18 Thus, we estimate the model using each variable separately. The untabulated results confirm that RANKNON is positively associated with small positive earnings surprises (p-value = 0.09). The coefficient on RANKAUD is negative but not statistically significant (p-value = 0.19). In addition, we estimate the model with the percentile rank, by auditor, of the amount of total fees disclosed by each firm (RANKTOT). Reynolds and Francis (2001) argue that larger clients create greater economic dependence regardless of the source of fees. However, we find that the coefficient on RANKTOT is insignificant (p-value = 0.62), suggesting that the composition of fees paid to the auditor is relevant.
Contrary to the robust evidence for the SURPRISE model, there is no evidence that firms paying higher non-audit fees are more likely to report small increases in earnings. Specifically, both FEERATIO and RANKNON are insignificant in the INCREASE regressions. Our results are consistent with Gore et al. (2001) who find a positive association between the purchase of non-audit services and meeting analysts' expectations for U.K. firms with a Big Five auditor, but no association between non-audit services and reporting small earnings increases or small profits. 19 The results for the control variables in the INCREASE regressions are consistent with the SURPRISE regressions with two exceptions; firms reporting a small increase in earnings have poor market performance and do not attract institutional owners. 18 Correlations between the auditor fee measures and auditor proxies BIGFIVE and AUDTEN are less than ± 0.30. 19 Although our sample includes clients of non-Big Five auditors, 96 percent of the firms included in the Table 5 regressions are audited by a Big Five auditor. We also report below that our results are robust to exclusion of firms with a non-Big Five auditor.
Discretionary accruals tests
The second test of the earnings management hypothesis examines the relation between discretionary accruals and the purchase of non-audit services. Table 6 reports (2001), we also estimate the discretionary accruals model separately for income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals. These results, presented in Panel B of Table 6, reveal that FEERATIO and RANKNON are positive and significant for firms with positive discretionary accruals, and negative and significant for firms with negative discretionary accruals. Assuming that companies with positive (negative) discretionary accruals are attempting to manage earnings up (down), these results confirm the finding that firms purchasing more non-audit services are better able to achieve their earnings objectives. In contrast, the coefficient estimate on RANKAUD is negative (positive) and significant for firms with positive (negative) discretionary accruals, suggesting that firms paying high audit fees manage earnings less than other firms. AUDTEN is also positive and significant for firms with negative discretionary accruals. The results indicate that total accruals (cash flows) are positively associated with income-increasing (income-decreasing) discretionary accruals. In addition, litigation risk is higher for firms with more positive discretionary accruals.
Following Reynolds and Francis
To examine the robustness of our results to alternative measures of discretionary accruals, we repeat the analyses in Table 6 using discretionary working capital accruals, defined as total accruals less depreciation expense, and discretionary operating accruals, defined as income before special items less cash from operations. The untabulated findings are similar to those reported in Table 6 . Our results are also robust to the inclusion of two additional variables that are correlated with discretionary accruals. We include the Altman Z-score as a proxy for financial distress, and the change in inventory because Thomas and Zhang (2001) suggests that much of the cross-sectional variation in discretionary accruals can be explained by changes in inventory. Finally, we estimate the model separately for each of the ranked fee variables.
Consistent with the results discussed above, we find that RANKNON and RANKAUD are significant, but that RANKTOT is insignificant. 20
Additional sensitivity analysis
Estimations for several alternative specifications indicate that the findings are generally robust. First, to further ensure that the results are not driven by cross-sectional variation between firms with a Big Five and non-Big Five auditor, we repeat the analyses in Tables 5 and 6 using only the sample of firms with a Big Five auditor. The untabulated results are consistent with those reported above. Second, we repeat the analyses with the log of total assets as the firm size control, with no change in inferences. We also estimate the models separately for the sample partitioned at the median value of firm size, measured using either the log of market value or the log of total assets. The results are qualitatively unchanged, except that FEERATIO and 20 Concurrent work by Chung and Kallapur (2001) reports no association between absolute discretionary accruals and the ratio of the client's total fees to the auditor's total fees. This result is consistent with our finding that RANKTOT is insignificant even though RANKNON and RANKAUD are individually significant. Chung and Kallapur (2001) also find no association between absolute discretionary accruals and the ratio of client non-audit fees to the auditor's total fees. We re-estimate the model using this measure instead of RANKNON and also find insignificant results. The difference in these findings is consistent with the fee data measuring the client-specific quasi-rents with error, suggesting that our use of ranked variables is appropriate.
RANKNON are insignificant in the upper half of the sample in the SURPRISE regressions.
Thus, we find some evidence that the association between non-audit fees and earnings management is not significant for larger firms.
Third, we disaggregate FEERATIO into two components -the ratio of IS fees to total fees (ISRATIO) and the ratio of other fees to total fees (OTHRATIO). Because of concerns that the provision of IS services poses a particularly strong threat to independence, the preliminary independence rules issued by the SEC on June 27, 2000 prohibited auditors from providing these services to their audit clients. The final rules relaxed the ban, but require separate disclosure of the IS component of non-audit fees. We repeat the analyses in Tables 5 and 6 substituting ISRATIO and OTHRATIO for FEERATIO. Only OTHRATIO is consistently significant in the untabulated results, possibly because relatively few firms report IS fees.
To control for systematic industry differences, we include fixed-effects for the industries identified in Table 1 . We also repeat the analyses using a common sample of 1,943 firms. The results from both of these specifications are consistent with our primary findings.
Market reaction to the disclosure of non-audit fees
The second hypothesis concerns the valuation effects of non-audit fees. We test this hypothesis using an event study. To identify the event date, i.e., the earliest date at which the fee information became public, we search the EDGAR database to identify firms that filed a preliminary proxy statement disclosing auditor fees. 21 If we find a preliminary proxy containing the necessary fee data then we use the release date of the preliminary proxy as the event date; if not, we use the release date of the definitive proxy. To mitigate the effects of confounding events, we eliminate observations if the proxy was filed within two days of 10-K, 10-Q, or 8-K. 22 We obtain returns data from the 2001 CRSP tape. Abnormal returns are event date market model prediction errors. Market model coefficients are estimated from firm-level regressions of raw returns on NYSE size-decile portfolio returns over the 100-day period ending 30 days prior to the event. Because stock prices will react to the new information contained in the auditor fee disclosures, tests of the shareholder wealth hypothesis require a proxy for the unexpected component of non-audit fees. The first set of tests uses the measures of non-audit fees discussed above to estimate the following regressions:
The fee measures in equations (5) and (6) We also derive a prediction error (FEERESIDUAL) using previously released data to proxy for unexpected non-audit fees. This prediction error is the residual from a model that assumes that non-audit fees vary with agency costs (Parkash and Venable 1993; Firth 1997) . The Appendix provides details on the empirical estimation of the model. This alternative proxy assumes that the publicly available data items in our model are those used by investors to form expectations of non-audit fees. Thus, we also estimate the following model:
Overlapping event dates may produce dependence across firm-events. Because all firm-observations are shifted to non-event dates as a block, firm-observations in each non-event date regression are temporally related as they are in the event date regression.
Summary statistics from the empirical estimation of equations (5) through (7) are reported in Table 7 . The coefficient estimates on FEERATIO and RANKNON are negative but not significant after controlling for cross-sectional dependence (two-tailed bootstrap p-values are 0.14 and 0.15, respectively). In contrast, FEERESIDUAL, which explicitly controls for the expected portion of non-audit fees, is negative and significant (bootstrap p-value=0.02). 23 These results provide modest evidence consistent with investors reducing valuations as compensation for a perceived reduction in audit quality. However, an important caveat to this analysis is that non-audit fees may have implications for the market's expectations of future cash flows unrelated to audit quality. For example, high non-audit fees may signal poor management quality or that the firm faces difficulties previously unknown by investors. Distinguishing this "performance" explanation from the "audit quality" explanation could be resolved by an examination of the subsequent accounting performance of sample firms. 24 23 One observation (Viador Inc) was found to be influential and deleted. The company announced the appointment of an interim CEO on May, 1, 2001, the same date its proxy statement was filed, leading to an 127% increase in stock price. Because this company had relatively low non-audit fees, its inclusion would increase the significance of the results. 24 One factor that suggests that investors are responding to a perceived reduction in audit quality is that over 99 percent of our sample had released fiscal 2000 earnings prior to the filing of the proxy statement, thus pre-empting at least a portion of the performance-related information content of the fee data.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper provides evidence on the association between non-audit fees and earnings management, as well as evidence on the stock market reaction to the announcement of non-audit fees. We find that firms purchasing more non-audit services from their auditors are more likely to just meet or beat analyst earnings expectations and to report larger absolute discretionary accruals. However, we find no association between the purchase of non-audit services and the ability to just meet prior year's earnings. To the extent that earnings management is one attribute of earnings quality, we interpret these results as suggesting that the purchase of non-audit services is associated with lower quality earnings. We also find evidence that the stock market reaction to the disclosure of non-audit fees is decreasing in the unexpected component of the non-audit to total fee ratio. This result indicate that investors associate non-audit fees with lower quality audits and, by implication, lower quality earnings.
Although our evidence indicates that firms paying high (low) non-audit (audit) fees are more likely to engage in earnings management, we do not address the related issue of whether the magnitude of non-audit and audit fees is associated with financial statement fraud. Additionally, SEC disclosure requirements may alter the existing equilibrium in the audit services market. For example, the disclosure of fee data could increase the competitiveness of the audit market by reducing the cost to firms of making price comparisons and negotiating fees. In addition, irrespective of the relation between non-audit services and earnings quality, firms may reduce the purchase of non-audit services to avoid the appearance of non-independence.
APPENDIX Estimation of Unexpected Non-Audit Fees
In this appendix, we develop a model to explain cross-sectional variation in FEERATIO.
The purpose of this model is to estimate the unexpected portion of non-audit fees for use in our market reaction tests. We base our model on Parkash and Venable (1993) and Firth (1997) who examine a company's decision to purchase non-audit services from their auditor, conditional on the level of auditing services purchased. They argue that companies facing high agency costs demand high quality audits and restrict the purchase of other services from their auditor.
We estimate the following model using all observations with the necessary data: AUDTEN, the number of years that the auditor has audited the financial statements of the company, controls for the length of the relationship between the auditor and client.
Performance may proxy for agency costs as well as the potential for the firm to benefit from the purchase of outside consulting. We include two measures of accounting performance, ROA, defined as net income divided by average total assets, and LOSS, an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports a net loss. We also include stock return performance, ANNRET, the compounded CRSP monthly return in calendar 2000. Institutional ownership (%INST) is the percentage of shares held by institutions (reported by Spectrum), and LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. We include operating cash flow scaled by average total asset (CFO) to control for firms' ability to purchase outside consulting services. In addition, we control for the extent and complexity of services performed by the auditor. INVREC is inventory plus accounts receivable as a percent of total assets. Rapidly growing companies may demand more consulting services thus we include, and thus we include FIN/ACQ, an indicator variable for firms that issued securities or acquired another company in 2000, and the market to book ratio (M/B). Finally, we control for firm size with the log of market value of equity (LOGMVE).
Summary statistics from the estimation of equation (A1) are reported in Table A1 . The model explains 31 percent of the cross-sectional variation in FEERATIO, comparable to the explanatory power of the models in Parkash and Venable (1993) and Firth (1997) . The results indicate that firms in three industries, food, extractive, and retail, purchase fewer non-audit services, while firms in the computer industry purchase more non-audit services. Consistent with Parkash and Venable (1993) and Firth (1997) , we find that firms with Big Five auditors and poorly performing firms, as measured by ROA and ANNRET, purchase more non-audit services.
However, neither institutional ownership nor leverage is significant. Acquisition and financing activities also contribute to significantly higher non-audit fees. Finally, we find that non-audit fees are increasing in firm size and decreasing in auditor tenure and growth. (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379), and computers (7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679) . BIGFIVE is equal to one if the firm's auditor is a Big Five firm, and zero otherwise; AUDTEN is the number of years that the auditor has audited the firm's financial statements; ROA is net income divided by average total assets; LOSS is equal to one if the firm reported a net loss in fiscal 2000, and zero otherwise; CFO is cash from operations, deflated by average total assets; ANNRET is the percentage compounded monthly stock return for calendar 2000 minus the CRSP valueweighted market index; %INST is the percent of shares held by institutions (reported by Spectrum); LEVERAGE is the ratio of total assets to total liabilities; INVREC is inventory plus accounts receivable as a percentage of total assets; FIN/ACQ is equal to one if the firm issued securities or acquired another company in fiscal 2000; LOGMVE is the log of market value of equity; and M/B is the market-to-book ratio. Audit is the aggregate fees billed for professional services rendered for the audit of the annual financial statements and the reviews of the quarterly financial statements; IS is the aggregate fees billed for financial information systems design and implementation; Other is the aggregate fees billed for all services rendered other than the services covered by Audit and IS; Non-Audit is the sum of IS and Other; Total is the total fees billed. The components of Other fees are as follows: Audit-Related, e.g., audits of employee benefit plans, regulatory audits, and preparation of registration statements and other SEC filings; Tax, e.g., preparation and filing of tax forms, and tax-related consulting; Combined Audit-Related and Tax, consisting of fees from both of the previous categories; Other Advisory, e.g., general consulting services, and information technology consulting for systems not associated with the financial statements. All levels are in thousands of dollars. % discl. indicates the percentage of observations disclosing the components of Other fees. 
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Total Fees is the total fees billed for Audit, IS, and Other, in thousands of dollars; Audit is the aggregate fees billed for professional services rendered for the audit of the annual financial statements and the reviews of the quarterly financial statements; IS is the aggregate fees billed for financial information systems design and implementation; Other is the aggregate fees billed for all services rendered other than the services covered by Audit and IS; Non-Audit is the sum of IS and Other. FEERATIO is the ratio of financial information system and other fees to total fees; RANKNON is the percentile rank of non-audit fees, by auditor; RANKAUD is the percentile rank of audit fees, by auditor; BIGFIVE is equal to one if the firm's auditor is a Big Five firm, and zero otherwise; AUDTEN is the number of years that the auditor has audited the firm's financial statements; SURPRISE is equal to one if the firm just meets or beats the consensus analyst forecast (i.e., forecast error of 0.00 or 0.01) for fiscal 2000, and zero otherwise; INCREASE is equal to one if the firm reports a small increase in earnings relative to the prior year, and zero otherwise; ABSACC is the absolute value of total accruals, equal to net income minus cash from operations, deflated by average total assets; CFO is cash from operations, deflated by average total assets; ABSCFO is the absolute value of cash from operations deflated by average total assets; ACC is total accruals, equal to net income minus cash from operations, deflated by average total assets; LITRISK is equal to one if the firm is in a high litigation risk industry identified by Francis et al. (1994 ) (SIC's 2833 -2836 , and zero otherwise; M/B is the market-to-book ratio; %INST is the percent of shares held by institutions (as reported by Spectrum); LOSS is equal to one if the firm reported a net loss in fiscal 2000, and zero otherwise; FIN/ACQ is equal to one if the firm issued securities or acquired another company in fiscal 2000; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total assets to total liabilities; ROA is net income divided by average total assets; ANNRET is the percentage compounded monthly stock return for calendar 2000 minus the CRSP value-weighted market index; MVE is the market value of equity (in millions); and ASSET is the book value of total assets (in millions). The variables are defined in Table 4 . The variables are defined in Table 4 . 
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Abnormal Returns are market model prediction errors on the proxy filing date, estimated using firm-level regressions of raw returns on the corresponding NYSE size-decile portfolio returns over the 100-day period ending 30 days prior to the proxy filing date. FEERATIO is the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees; RANKNON is the percentile rank of non-audit fees, by auditor; RANKAUD is the percentile rank of audit fees, by auditor; FEERESIDUAL is the prediction error from the model estimated in Appendix A. 
